In today’s hearing on Jonathan Del Arroz v. S.F. Science Fiction Conventions, Inc., Santa Clara County Superior Court Judge Mark H. Pierce issued a tentative ruling tossing four out of the five causes of action in Del Arroz’s lawsuit against Worldcon 76’s parent corporation. A fifth complaint, defamation, remains before the court.
Del Arroz sued SFSFC last April after the Worldcon 76 committee announced he would not be allowed to attend the convention (“Del Arroz Files Suit Against Worldcon 76”; “We have taken this step because he has made it clear that he fully intends to break our code of conduct….”)
The five causes of action asserted in Del Arroz’s complaint were: (1) Violation of California Civ. Code §51 (Unruh Act, claiming discrimination based on “political affiliation and political beliefs”); (2) Violation of Civ. Code §51.5 (also a law against various forms of discrimination); (3) Violation of Civ. Code §51.7, the Bane Civil Rights Act, a law which protects against “violence, or intimidation by threat of violence” because of a political affiliation (or other arbitrary discrimination); (4) Violation of Civ. Code §52.1 (the Ralph Civil Rights Act); and (5) Defamation.
SFSFC’s attorney Ann G. Nguyen filed demurrer motions against the first four causes on October 11. A ‘demurrer’ motion is one objecting to a pleading by the opposite side, claiming opposing counsel’s claimed facts weren’t sufficient to support a cause of action. JDA’s attorney Peter Sean Bradley filed opposition responses with the court earlier this month. (The attorneys previously shared their positions in correspondence.) Nguyen also filed an Anti-SLAPP motion against the fifth cause of action.
The court sustained SFSFC’s four demurrers, but denied the Anti-SLAPP motion.
The court ruled that in the first two causes of action Del Arroz had claimed protections that are not part of the law. About the Unruh Act it said —
Plaintiff has failed to identify any published California decision expressly stating that “political affiliation” is a protected classification for purposes of the Unruh Act and the Court is unaware of any.
…“Political affiliation” is simply not a personal characteristic protected under the Unruh Act.
And about Section 51.5 it said –
The claim fails as a matter of law because, as explained above, “political affiliation” is not a “characteristic listed or defined in subdivision (b) or (e) of Section 51.”
The court ruled against JDA’s third cause of action because there was no threat of violence, the sole support for which was the committee’s email stating that “If you are found on the premises of the convention center or any of the official convention hotels you will be removed.”
The Court concludes that a reasonable person would not have perceived the Jan. 2, 2018 email from Lori Buschbaum as a threat of violence. Leave to amend is DENIED as the defect cannot be cured without contradicting the existing factual allegations that the sole basis for the claim is the January 2, 2018 email from Lori Buschbaum.
Likewise, the court concluded the fourth cause failed to show any violation of the Ralph Civil Rights Act —
Under no circumstances could this be objectively construed as a threat of violence against a specific person (Plaintiff) made by a person (Lori Buschbaum) with the apparent ability to carry out such a threat.
SFSFC’s Anti-SLAPP motion to strike the fifth cause of action, defamation, was denied by the court. SLAPP refers to a “strategic lawsuit against public participation,” a suit intended to intimidate and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal defense until they abandon their criticism or opposition. California law counters SLAPPs by allowing a defendant to make a special motion to strike a complaint when it arises from conduct that falls within the rights of petition or free speech.
To receive protection under the anti-SLAPP statute, SFSFC had to show that its statement why Del Arroz wouldn’t be allowed to attend the Worldcon was “made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.” If they satisfied those conditions, then JDA would have to prove there is a probability he would succeed with his defamation claim. However, the court decided that while SFSFC made its statement in a public forum, this was not “an issue of public interest.”
Defendant’s special motion to strike the fifth cause of action for defamation is DENIED for failure to meet the initial burden to establish that Plaintiff’s defamation claim is based on its protected activity. Defendant’s publicly accessible web site and social media sites do constitute “public forums” for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.
However Defendant has failed to establish that its statement that Plaintiff had been barred from the convention because of “racist” and “bullying” behavior (and this is the only reasonable interpretation of Defendant’s statement) concerned a matter of public interest.
…Defendant’s evidence (in particular the declarations of Kevin Roche and Charles Serface) fails to establish that its statement regarding Plaintiff was made in the context of an “ongoing controversy, dispute or discussion,” of interest to a definable, measurable portion of the public. At best Defendant’s evidence shows that Plaintiff engaged in online arguments with a handful of identified persons in which he used disparaging insults (but notably not any clearly racist ones). This evidence does not support Defendant’s “public controversy” argument with any actual evidence that any sizable portion of Defendant’s claimed membership of 7,812 persons (let alone the “science fiction community as a whole,” which Defendant fails to even define much less explain how its awareness and engagement could be or were measured) was even aware of Plaintiff’s identity, much less his disagreements with a handful of identified persons or with Defendant as an organization and was engaged in a discussion about the subject before Defendant’s January 4, 2018 announcement that Plaintiff had been banned from attending the convention because “racist and bullying behavior is not acceptable,” clearly referring to some (unidentified) behavior of Plaintiff.
Because the Court finds that Defendant has not met its burden on the first step of the analysis, it is not necessary for the Court to address the second step.
The tentative ruling will dispose of the first four causes of action unless Del Arroz appeals, and the case will continue with just the defamation claim.
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“Leave to amend is DENIED” = no, you can’t rewrite it and try to sneak it back in.
click
I too go “Click”.
Clickity
Called it. Those causes of action were wacky from the get-go, and the court ruled exactly as I predicted concerning the alleged civil rights violation (‘political affiliation’ not being established as a protected category under the Unruh Act, not to mention that plaintiff’s claim to have been ejected solely on account of being a Trumpista is dubious in the extreme), and the ludicrous claim that ‘you will be ejected’ was a threat of violence.
Given that SFSFC wasn’t able to meet the required ‘issue of public interest’ test for SLAPP protection, it’s not at all surprising that the residual libel charge needs to be decided at trial: In order to get a tort charge dismissed during pre-trial manoeuvering, a defendant must show that even if the facts plaintiff asserted are assumed valid, that the case is not legally sufficient, that it fails the ‘If so, so what?’ test (that underlies typical demurrer motions).
In this case, the judge feels it’s not been proven that Del Arroz’s libel claim is defective in law. It remains to be seen whether he can prove libel, let alone get awarded above $1 in damages.
Speaking in general terms, I’d say conrunners ought to think twice, think three times before issuing statements not only excluding a problem attendee, but making derogatory claims of fact about him/her, because those immediately raise the risk of a libel action that will consume time and money even if the action fizzles. Saying nothing about the person’s motives and character can take a lot of restraint, but gives that disaffected party and the party’s lawyer that much less to work with.
.
Yes, that does seem to be the general lesson one can take away from this ruling.
The more-specific lesson is the same that one always takes away from incidents involving that tiresome individual, which is: Decline to have anything at all to do with him, refuse all contact with him and reject all bait from him, online or in person, at all times.
I would love to be a fly on the wall during the defamation discovery and proceedings, given all the receipts that SFSFC will no doubt be able to produce.
You can read most of the filings here.
I wondered what the legal standard for proving defamation is in a lawsuit. Nolo.com has a good explanation, if anyone else is wondering, too:
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/defamation-law-made-simple-29718.html
A plaintiff who claims defamation has to show the statement(s) for which she is suing were: published, unprivileged, false, and injurious.
WorldCon’s statements were “published” and they were “unprivileged.” I assume this won’t be disputed.
Whether the statements WorldCon is being sued over can be proved to be false in a court of law? I have no idea. I assume that will depend on evidence. And perhaps also on interpretation? Is there an accepted legal standard for what constitutes “bullying and racist behavior?”
Proving whether the statement(s) made are injurious seems to raise some interesting questions.
According to Nolo, for example, the more public a figure you are, the higher the standard for proving the published comments injured you. (Elected officials and celebrities have much less protection from insulting public statements than my next door neighbor does, for example.). Will JDA’s well-established habit of self-describing as “the leading Hispanic voice” of a major genre raise the standard of proof the court expects from him to prove injury?
Also, Nolo says that “those suing for defamation must show how their reputations were hurt by the false statement — for example, the person lost work; was shunned by neighbors, friends, or family members; or was harassed by the press. Someone who already had a terrible reputation most likely won’t collect much in a defamation suit.”
I think I’ll just leave that there….
Am loving the DENIED in all-caps. Kind of a lot. And deservedly so on the first 4. Wonder how much he’s out in legal fees from all this uselessness, and if he’ll go on trying to roll that rock up the hill. Did he bother to show, or just send his wacky lawyer?
@JJ: it bids fair to rival the infamous “Cocky” trademark hearing, the transcript of which amused us all so.
@Laura: it got him a LOT of free publicity on the wingnut welfare train. And as to your last sentence… well…yeah…
(Had some hardware put into my ankle this afternoon — still feeling the buzz but know I will not be so chatty tomorrow and probably not online when the serious meds and nerve block wear off. The credentials approve of me sitting, but disapprove mightily of the crutches. I accidentally clicked on my File 770 bookmark just now. Must have been karma to cheer me. At least I don’t have to give a Hugo speech like Jo van E did, or be in the hospital like Mike.)
I, too, am looking forward to how the last charge plays out.
@Laura Resnick, yes, Nolo.com (which used to be Nolo Press before that fabulous small company shut its doors and it became just a larger company’s Web brand) is an excellent place to start. I used to visit their storefront in West Berkeley, and cherished their Nolo News and particularly the Lawyer Joke Page on the back, which feature they finally had to retire when they’d told all the actually funny lawyer jokes.
I have my own small piece about the legaly required elements of defamation under US common law, from the days when I was a Board member of Bay Area Skeptics, and trust that OGH won’t mind my posting the whole thing:
A defamatory statement is one that injures the reputation of another party, either by lowering the standing of the injured party in the community or by tending to make others refrain from associating with him. However, it’s not just any such statement.
a) If the speaker can prove that the statement is true, it is not defamatory.
b) For slander, it must actually have had that effect on listeners, not just potentially. That is, if you orally claim that X is a child-molester and all other tests are met, it’s not defamation unless people actually believed your claim. The assumption of actual damage is only assumed in certain specific cases of “slander per se” (as always, assuming the claim is untrue):
i) charges that plaintiff committed a criminal offence
ii) charges that plaintiff has one of certain “loathsome” contagious diseases
iii) charges that impute unchastity or adultery to any woman (antique sexist holdovers; we have them)
iv) charges disparaging plaintiff’s conduct of office, trade, calling, or business being conducted at that time
c) For libel, actual damages are presumed if the statement is one one of a small number of types considered to be “libel per se” (defamation that is apparent on the face of a communication): charges of criminal activity, adultery, “contagious distemper,” or dishonesty, as well as any charge which injures the plaintiff in his or her trade, business, or profession.” Otherwise, actual damages must be shown by specific and unambiguous evidence of wrongful harm, which is called “libel per quod” (as opposed to “libel per se”).
d) “Publication”: It must be made to a third party. X telling Y alone that Y is a child-molester does not defame Y. Similarly, if X (above) tells only Y, and Y then tells others, then X hasn’t defamed Y — because Y did the publishing.
e) The statement’s not defamation if it’s in a situation subject to “absolute privilege”. There is a list of such situations, including communications with one’s spouse, and testimony in court or in legislative or executive governmental hearings. (It should be noted that you could evade slander, only to be charged with perjury.)
f) The statement’s not defamation if it’s in one of a variety of situations subject to “qualified privilege”. Most involve speaking on matters of public or community concern, and must be made without malice. This is related to the press’s 1st Amendment protection against restrictive legislation (such as libel law: NY Times v. Sullivan, US Supreme Court, 1964.)
g) The defamatory statement must be fairly understood by listeners to be a statement of fact, rather than opinion. Opinions need not be fair to be privileged: Unfair opinions are protected by law. This distinction between allegations of fact and of opinion is a grey area that would be decided by the court. The key question would be whether the purported opinion implies some false factual claim, e.g. “I think X is a murderer.”
h) In most states, it is not defamation unless the speaker was negligent in checking his/her facts. If he/she meets an implied standard of reasonable care and was mistaken, then he/she would be not liable.
i) epublishing someone else’s libel/slander can itself be defamatory, if the “publisher” had the knowledge and opportunity to not do so. E.g., if a caller defames someone on a KGO radio talk show, KGO is probably not liable, but would not be protected if it later replayed that segment from tape.
j) The statement’s not defamatory if the target’s reputation is alreadyso unsavoury that no damage was done.
I had a long footnote on the word ‘damages’ clarifying that this requires actual provable financial/business loss (which can be provable reputation loss with economic consequences, but must be substantially proved), not just ‘people might think less of me’, and distinguishing the several types: actual, compensatory, speculative, consequential, and punitive — and how they work.
The full thing’s on my Web site, if anyone wants the long footnote, too.
Clickster.
@ Rick
So I’m guessing “you’ve offended my self-esteem” isn’t a persuasive legal basis for defamation? Go figure.
If at any time he has intimated that this kerfuffle helped his book sales, I think his defamation claim would be in a lot of trouble.
Thanks for that explanation Rick.
@Laura, yeah, who knew? ;->
Yes, among the things newcomers to defamation law often don’t ‘get’ is that the law is not impressed by damages claims that amount to ‘my feelings were hurt’. The actual concept in law requires a showing of some sort of economic loss that can be objectively demonstrated, even if it’s only a high likelihood of lost sales. But plaintiff has to actually prove that, not just moan about the fish that got away.
I don’t have the exact wording of Ms. Buschbaum’s comments handy, but wasn’t it a passing swipe that ‘racist and bullying behavior is not acceptable’? It’s not clear to me, first of all, that that’s fairly read as having made a claim about a specific individual, and particularly unclear that it’s a claim of fact as required by defamation law. Those matters certainly sound like opinion, and, as the legal saying goes, opinion is always true, hence cannot be defamatory.
But that’ll have to wait for the lawyering and the judging.
The exact wording is quoted in the linked 2018 post, is it not? Or do you have something else in mind?
@Mike Glyer: The simple answer is that I was ridiculously lazy.
ETA: But I try to be very careful about directly commenting on matters in litigation. It’s always useful and appropriate to talk about hypotheticals, but talking about case specifics can lead to any of several types of trouble, IMO. So, I leaned away from assuming I was quoting the exact phrasing, even though I certainly could have and looked a bit silly not bothering to try.
Poor Jon. Still, I expect he’s claimed it as a historic victory.
NickPheas: Poor Jon. Still, I expect he’s claimed it as a
historichistrionic victory.There, fixed that for you. 😉
:quietly listens:
I would say the whole thing increased his book sales. And he did crowd fund some of his legal expenses.
How much is San Jose going to charge Del Arroz for the expenses of having a police presence at Worldcon?
@Rick Moen: your point (f) is interesting in view of recent reports (e.g. CNN 2 days ago) that the great legal mind Clarence Thomas said that Sullivan should be reconsidered. (The NY Timeshas the story with less clutter but may be unreachable for people who’ve already read several articles this month.)
I wonder when he’s going to call for Brown to be reconsidered.
I want to thank Mike again for his superb coverage of this case. As one of the named defendants (I’m one of SFSFC’s directors, as most of you probably know), I obviously cannot discuss the case, but I’m reading the coverage here most avidly.
@Donut Glaze — Thank you!! I’m enjoying defendant’s demurrer MPA with my morning coffee — “… the Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations to support these conclusions …” — tee hee. Love the way defense counsel chews up plaintiff’s poorly-drafted claims in voracious sharklike fashion.
@JJ — Maybe if we’re lucky, some of the sillier discovery highlights will end up attached as exhibits to future motions.
@Lurker — Tell them you want hardware with spikes that shoot out, like Wolverine has. Never know when you might need to extrude some spikes.
I just crawled out of an 11-year gig doing computer stuff for trial lawyers. Reviewing these pleadings is helping me detox as I finish my novel and gear up the search for a new day job.
Harassing people and filing vexatious lawsuits is no way to go through life, son.
Bless his heart.
While I’m a little bit sorry that the Anti-SLAPP motion failed, I can sort of understand it. Anti-SLAPP is designed to prevent financial intimidation, where one side has effectively-unlimited funds compared to the other, and is thus unconcerned about the merits of the case they’re bringing.
Whatever JDA’s other issues with merit and whatnot, he does not seem to be in a position to darken the skies with hordes of expensive lawyers.
Anyway, I believe the next step is discovery, which should be fairly interesting.
@Donut Glaze: Thank you, thank you, for the upload of scanned copies of selected pleadings to Scribd. I’m rummaging through those right now.
And, by the way, some reasons to be really careful about making comments concerning ongoing litigation are obvious, some maybe less so: 1. To avoid drawing fire from angry litigious people. (Don’t imagine you’re too insignificant or impoverished to sue.) 2. To avoid creating complications for whichever litigant you like. 3. To steer clear of risking unauthorised practice of law.
The safest way to skirt all those pitfalls is to stick to general legal issues the case appears to raise and avoid like the plague derogatory factual claims about the parties — though of course it’s pretty tempting to talk about case specifics. Just be careful, ‘kay?
Donut Glaze uploaded five documents.
Document #1 of 5: Judge Pierce’s tentative rulings on ‘law and motion’. This is a key part of pretrial manoeuvring, and a large number of cases are basically won or lost through pretrial motions and ‘discovery’. Pierce recaps the basis of the suit, listing the five causes of action, and says today’s hearing is to decide defendant’s special motion to strike the fifth cause of action (defamation) and to decide defendant’s demurrer against the other four. Defamation objection is covered first — but there’s also an interesting footnote saying that defendant’s submission of the CoC was not persuasive because it appeared worded to have no effect before Worldcon 76 opened, and because key phrases such as ‘harassment’ and ‘any behaviour that annoys other persons’ was too vague.
On the defamation charge, Pierce reviews the requirements for SLAPP protection, basically that the act drawing litigation was in furtherance of defendant’s right of petition or free speech in public interest — but it’s not enough for the lawsuit to be revenge for the protected act; the legal claim must be shown to be based on the protected petitioning or speech. Pierce ruled that defendant SFSFC failed to show that plaintiff Del Arroz had been barred on account of ‘racist’ and ‘bullying’ behaviour, the only public interest issues defendant had cited in its reasoning asserting an anti-SLAPP shield.
To be on a matter of public interest (qualifying for anti-SLAPP protection), the discussion in question must concern ongoing public controversy, not just of interest to some people, must be of concern to a substantial crowd, the litigated statements must be closely concerned to the public controversy, and it cannot just be clothed in that controversy for protective purposes by broadcasting it broadly. In short, SFSFC’s submissions failed to show that the few online bits of nastiness submitted as evidence qualified as a genuine public controversy on matters of public interest. So, Pierce denied the attempt to dismiss the defamation charge on merely anti-SLAPP grounds.
Turning to the other four charges, Judge Pierce stopped for a moment to chide the lawyers for failing to hold a proper pre-trial conference on the demurrer motion. He says, just sending each other a barrage of e-mails and faxes doesn’t comply, people. Do it better, please.
Next, Pierce summarily swats down Del Arroz’s attempt to cite a New York state case decision (allegedly one establishing that ‘creed’ is a protected class) in opposition to the demurrer: Not relevant to California law, Mr. Bradley, says he.
Pierce recaps the bit about a demurrer being an ‘If so, so what?’ motion, where defendant asserts that plaintiff’s use of law is fatally defective even if the asserted facts are correct. On the first charge, claiming Unruh Civil Rights Act violation, Pierce immediately agrees that defendant had completely failed to state sufficient facts: A handwave about your ‘political affiliation and political beliefs’ doesn’t establish that your civil rights have been violated just because someone doesn’t want you around, sorry, Mr. Del Arroz. In particular, Pierce says lawyer Bradley’s effort to cite Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wofson, where a renter sued an apartment complex over a policy banning families with minor children, as supposedly establishing a basis for Unruh Act protection of ‘political affiliation’, flops because the court made no ruling at all on ‘political affiliation’. Pierce further points to subsequent caselaw interpreting the Marina Point decision, that he says makes clear the Unruh Act wasn’t an open invitation to adding arbitrary protected classes beyond those it enumerates.
The second cause of action, the California civil code provision banning illegally-discriminatory blacklists or boycotts (section 51.5), he dismisses on the same basis: Civic Code section 5.15 doesn’t have ‘political affiliation’ as a protected characteristic.
Third charge was on the civil code provision banning violence and intimidating threats of violence based on race, ancestry, religion, etc. (Bane Civil Rights Act). Predictably, Pierce finds Worldcon 76’s ‘you will be removed’ warning to be nothing at all like a threat of violence.
Fourth charge, civil and administrative recourse for victims of violence against protected classes of persons (Ralph Civil Rights Act), again, gets summarily dismissed because Pierce rules that there was no threat of violence.
That was the main action, right there. Bam!
Document #2 of 5: Chuck Serface, head of Member Services, submitted a statement reproducing screenshots of sundry rather inane Del Arroz social media postings about near-future troublemaking and related matters. Judge Pierce ultimately ruled that these were insufficient to qualify for ‘public interest’ SLAPP protection.
Document #3 of 5: Defendant’s lawyer Ann Nguyen makes a statement that she’d discussed her anti-SLAPP motion with plaintiff’s lawyer Peter Sean Bradley through several e-mails and faxes. Separately, Judge Pierce had noted that Nguyen and Bradley hadn’t actually complied with the law’s requirements for conferencing on such matters.
Document #4 of 5: Nguyen’s citations of points and authorities (prior caselaw) in support of her demurrer motion. Nguyen obviously was persuasive, as Pierce completely agreed.
Document 5 of 5: Just a court-boilerplate form scheduling and describing the case management conference that was held on December 18, 2018.
Rick:
How is the burden of evidence in that particular decision? Does the speaker have to prove their statement beyond reasonable doubt, or is it enough that it’s more likely true than not, or something else?
Rick Moen: I guess you’re enjoying yourself but I feel insulted that you’re largely repeating information in the main post, as if it had not been made clear to begin with.
Some years ago a judge in Massachusetts threw out a crook’s lawsuit for slander or defamation on the basis of “~Your rap sheet of arrests and convictions is so long and your reputation is so bad that there is NOTHING anyone can say that to make you sound worse…~”
The “Declaration of Jonathan Del Arroz” is a better work of fiction than his stories.
I got that photo from JDA’s own blog. What a terrible thing, running a picture Jon had taken of himself!
I’m sorry, was that supposed to be a secret? Again, it’s a self-identification JDA published in his blog when he complained about not being invited to be on BayCon programming. I don’t just go around pointing at people saying “Zap! You’re a Trump supporter!” (Talk about an unwanted superpower.)
He should learn how to spell his good friends’ names.
Wait a minute, how did a true statement slip into this document?
Mike Glyer: The “Declaration of Jonathan Del Arroz” is a better work of fiction than his stories.
Where did you read this?
@Mike —
and partly because the very well-known science fiction authors Larry Corriea [sic] and Sara [sic] Hoyt are also Hispanic conservatives and friends of mine.
If they were truly “good friends” of his, you’d think he would know that both Larry and Sarah have publicly denied considering themselves to be members of any minority, Hispanic or otherwise.
Reading through those uploaded documents on Scribd…
…is there a word (aside from ‘vanity’) for reading through court documents just to see if your name crops up somewhere?
@Mike Glyer: Sorry, you’re right, I really should have more carefully read what you wrote at the top of the page. I was just delighted to see a link to the court filings, which I’ve not seen since the case left San Joaquin County, was engrossed in the judge’s reasoning, and didn’t stop to see how much you’d already covered. But you’re right, I was geeking out on that and having (too much of) a fine time.
@Johan P: This being civil (not criminal) proceedings, the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence, for the affirmative defence of truth to apply — and substantive truth is enough. (As a reminder, there are plenty of other defences, such as ‘this was clearly opinion so cannot be defamation in the first place’, but truth is a complete defence if defendant can show it.)
As noted, in the USA because of the NYT v. Sullivan case, if plaintiff’s established to be a public figure, he/she has the additional burden of establishing, even if the claim was totally false, that defendant made it with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for the truth. Whether Mr. Del Arroz, the self-designated ‘leading Hispanic voice in SF’, is a public figure is certainly a sticking point for him, I think.
Camestros Felapton: is there a word (aside from ‘vanity’) for reading through court documents just to see if your name crops up somewhere?
Legal Ego-Googling?
(you did see that you are indeed mentioned, I presume)
L-Ego-ogling?
To be fair, both authors—of Lusitanian descent and extraction respectively—have claimed, rather laughably, to be Hispanic at the height of Puppymania. Hoyt even called herself “brown.” This was only for propaganda purposes. Both have just as conveniently forgotten saying any such thing.
Just found it. I’m an exhibit. My parents would be so proud…
Um, I’m embarrassed to note that there are nine PDFs on Scribd, not five. Missed that scroll button, sorry. The others, keeping it short:
1. Con chair Kevin Roche’s declaration supporting the anti-SLAPP motion that the Judge didn’t buy. 2. Points and authorities for that motion. 3. Paperwork from the December case management conference (a ‘minute order’). 4. The actual demurrer motion the judge granted, dimissing all but the one remaining claim.
There was briefly one more, but it’s now marked as deleted, and appears to have been a duplicate.
What I don’t see there (yet?) is the fabulously entertaining Declaration of Jonathan Del Arroz from which Mike quotes.
@Nicholas Mamatas: Being extracted from Lusitania sounds potentially painful.
Personally, I took a cruise ship (and also waited for it to be Portugal, seeing that my Latin and proto-Hispano-Celtic were both insufficient for tourism).
IIRC Mike has asked us not to speculate on or question someone’s ethnic background.
Side note, I’m also Portuguese and had to look up “Lusitanian.” Since Correia comes from about three blocks east of where my father came from, he probably had to look it up too in order to claim descent and/or extraction. Not to speak for an entire group, but it’s hard to imagine anyone Portuguese claiming in good faith to be Hispanic.
Whatever. I hope this ridiculous nonsense is over soon, but civil cases aren’t known for speed and this could potentially remain unresolved for a generation.
Due diligence, surely.
Very true!
Also…an important lesson I learnt from you: keep the receipts! It may look like trivia but one day it might be important to somebody.